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Abstract 
 
Causality is an important concept in applied econometrics. It helps us 
to identify the direction which variable is a cause (policy) and which one is 
an impact. This paper applied the technique of Granger causality to 
determine the causal relationship between total government expenditures, 
total tax revenues, and regional income in the case of regencies’/ 
municipalities’ local government in Indonesia over the period of 1988-2003. 
Unlike other researchers, this study breaks down the total local 
government expenditures into operating and capital expenditures. Similarly, 
the total local government revenues are specified further into local own 
revenues and intergovernmental transfers (tax & non tax revenue sharing 
and grant). Using annual panel data, the analysis discovers a firm 
bidirectional effect from expenditure to revenue. Meanwhile, we found a 
unidirectional between regional income and grant. It suggests that the 
preference of controlling either the spending or revenue decisions is 
conducted both central and local governments to synchronize fiscal 
performance. Policy implication that could be drawn is that local 
governments may increase regional economic performance without 
depending on grants from central government. 
 
  
 
INTRODUCTION  
         Budget is one of the instruments of government fiscal policy to 
influence the economy. Fiscal policy works to influence the economy through 
the budget as a function of allocation, distribution, and stabilization 
(Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989). Basically, fiscal policy will transfer the    
Purchasing power of community (in the form of taxes, benefits, duties, and / 
or loans) to the government and then will transfer back to the community 
either directly or indirectly, and distributed according to certain 
considerations (Santoso, 1992).  
 
      In the regional scope, the three function of the budget will be 
transferred   to the regions. Fisher (1996) provide that the transfer is a general 
phenomenon that occurs in all countries in the world irrespective of the 
system of government  and even  has become the most prominent 
characteristic of financial relations between central and local governments. In 
developed countries, approximately 5 percent of national income is 
distributed back to the regions through the transfer. In the countries of 
Eastern Europe that are experiencing economic transition, the volume of 
transfers reaches 25-80 percent of total regional revenue (Wright and Nemec, 
1997).  
 
      This fact indicates that the transfer is very strategic role in 
influencing the regional economy. The influence strategic of the transfer can 
not be separated from the interaction between the revenues with the 
expenditure allocation. Basically, the impact of the transfer is influenced by 
many factors, of which the first is how transfer proportion is allocated to 
finance for different types of expenditure. Second, how big the various types 
of expenditure can stimulate the regional economic activity that can further 
re-absorbed in the form of revenues from their own regions. 
 
      The above phenomena show that transfer, expenditure, revenues 
from the region itself, and a regional income has a very close relationship. 
This paper attempts examine the relevance of the fourth, especially in the 
relationship causality. Various studies have been done on the same topic. 
Even so, this study has at least two significant differences. First, this studies 
more about the relationship in the fourth more detail explanation. Second, 
this study tested endogen transfer as pre-condition examine in the 
relationship with other variables. This paper will be organized as follows. 
First examine a glance chronology of the financial system in Indonesia. 
Explain the next section reviews the theory and empirical findings relevant to 
this study. And data analysis method used is described in the fourth. 
Empirical results are presented in the next section. Finally, the paper is closed 
with some final notes. 
 
Regional Financial Condition  
 
           Since the beginning of independence, the government has 
implemented a transfer policy. In general, many kinds of subsidies and aids 
are distributed to the regions to close the gap between expenditure and 
revenue. Therefore, the criteria of the various aids and subsidies are not very 
clear and depend on the policy unilaterally center government. It just so 
difficult for local government in preparation for APBD (the local district 
budget) does not have any certainty about the amount of subsidy that will be 
received. 
 
           During the New Order, the transfer mechanism to go through the SDO, 
non-DIP Inpres program, and DIP. Autonomous Region subsidies are 
intended to support the routine budget of local governments in order to 
overcome the financial imbalance inter-level government. Most of the SDO is 
used to finance for government employee salaries. While DIP (list of field 
project) is allocated to finance the development expenditure as embodiment 
deconcentration mechanism. 
 
      Transfer in the form Inpres (Regional Development Assistance) is 
given to a regional for finance development activities in the region. The Basis 
of this transfer is part of the handover to local affairs and the limited 
capability of region to finance. The main objective of Inpres is to achieve 
equity employment opportunities, participation in development and equity. 
At the beginning of the implementation in the year 1969, Inpres provided as 
general aid to municipalities and districts 
 
             In realization, the transfer problems in Indonesia focused on the 
efficiency of using. The implementation of transfer is controlled by the 
central government. The Allocation is marked also by the size of aid in the 
form of projects that contain a lot of stiffness (Ahmad, 1990). The small local 
discretion over the use of funds in accordance with its needs cause of 
inefficiency of the project that was conducted (Heller, 1979; Devarajan, 
Swaroop, and Zou, 1996). 
 
           Transfer is not the only source of financing for local government 
spending. Local governments spending should be financed from the PAD 
(Regional own Income). However, norms can not be maintained. The Data 
show that the rate of growth of the local government spending tends to grow 
faster than the rate of PAD growth. The proportion of funds PAD only able to 
finance the highest of 20 percent. The Dependence of local financing from  
transfer brought the consequences on the effectiveness of the mission of  
transfer. 
 
          Transfer should be efforts to encourage the collection of  PAD   
(Naganathan and Sivagnanam, 1999; Sidik, 2001) and meet the needs of local 
fiscal (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989). The fact that  transfer from center 
government has  negative correlation  with the local tax collection and   the  
region fiscal  needs  (Suparmoko and Uppal, 1986). Almost no local 
initiatives to improve their own resources in financing the expenditure   
(Booth, 1988). As a result, the local financial system is a disincentive to 
apply for local governments to encourage development  and to  improve  
PAD (Basri, 1999). 
 
The important role of transfer and  the low of PAD on the other hand    
shows  that the  low of fiscal decentralization degree . This factor has been 
considered by the technocrats and academics become one of the factors that a 
barricade in the region development. Many economists who argued that to 
facilitate development in the region, local government  should be larger 
authorities to increase the local income. 
 
            The Ideas of fiscal decentralization has actually appeared in the Law 5 
/ 1974 on Mains Regional Government. In fact, the system is going fiscal 
centralization. This is supported by the strength of political polarization that 
occurred at that time (Ardani, 1992). Fiscal centralization is caused by the 
increase in state revenues from oil and gas sector in the 1970s decade. The 
high Budget Capability allows central  government  control budget even in 
the local level (Sondakh, 1999). On the other hand there is such reluctance to 
submit to the central government's fiscal management in local government by 
reason of political stability in that time become a point of national 
development (Kuncoro, 1995). 
 
           The realization of fiscal decentralization began in April 1995 through 
25 trials of regional autonomy in the 26 districts in all provinces (except the 
province of DKI Jakarta). the determination of this program is not only 
associated with the collapse centralized planning and popular strategy of 
growth with equity (growth with equity), but also an awareness that 
development is a complex process full of uncertainty and that can not easily 
be controlled and planned from the center (Kuncoro, 1995) . The realization 
of fiscal decentralization began in April 1995 through 25 trials of regional 
autonomy in the 26 districts in all provinces (except the province of DKI 
Jakarta). the determination of this program is not only associated with the 
failure of  centralized planning and strategy of growth with equity, but also 
an awareness that development is a complex process and full of uncertainty  
that can not easily be controlled and planned from the center (Kuncoro, 1995) 
. 
         Efforts to achieve region  financial independence was still enough to 
meet the constraints. The Indonesia economic crisis  since the year 1997  
bring the impact of the unstable sector revenues in  APBD (the regional 
budget). This condition is more concern in the region with a low level of 
PAD. Local government with low  PAD would  have  high financial 
dependence to  the central government and the provincial government. In 
fact, at the same time, the central government and provincial governments 
face financial pressures that are not much different, so the number of 
transfers that can be channeled to the region declined sharply. 
 
          Financial condition of the region is not conducive and  worsened again 
by the Law. 18/1997 on Local  Taxation and Local Retribution.  This Law  
determine  that the city government and the district may only collect the six 
types of taxes. The Instability of revenue sector is a consequence of low 
levels of certainty the size of the budget that can be spending . The low Level 
of revenue certainty cause of the possibility of   shifting on the component of 
income and the expenditure will be greater (Halim, 2002). 
 
           Recognizing that structural changes occurred in the  performance of  
region financial , the government change the regulations on local taxation and 
local retribution  through the Law. 34/2000. On the basis of this new Act, the 
provincial government, cities, and districts have expanded the scope of the 
local taxation and the local retribution . Although the scope has expanded 
revenue sources, in fact PAD in the city and district level are still not able to 
increase local fiscal capacity, especially for cities and districts outside Java 
that does not have any relative basis the receipt of PAD is high. 
 
            Structural issues in the regional budget are responded by the central 
government with issue the Law. 32 and 33/2004 on the revision of Law 
22/1999 on Regional Autonomy and Law 25/1999 on Fiscal and Regional 
Center. Those two laws formally give greater authority to local governments 
to dig up the potential revenue from the region with its own use. With those 
two laws, local governments are expected to manage the local financial 
independently based on the regions potential. 
 
 
REVIEW OF PRIOR RESEARCH  
 
     Empirically, causality testing between revenues and spending in 
various countries show the diversity of results. Initially, the empirical studies 
on this matter are not explicitly made. Generally, researchers directed 
attention to the relation between the amounts of government fiscal activities 
with the stages of economic development (Cheng, 1999). Blackley (1986), 
for example, supports the view that the increase in tax revenues means that 
the government are facing budget deficits as a result of the high level of 
expenditure. For Blackley, the direction of causality is starting from the 
receipt of the tax then   goes to expenditure. 
 
           Manage and Marlow (1986) find empirical facts  that  one way 
causality in the United States that flows from the revenue  of  central 
government (federal) lead to the expenditure. They criticize  the 
administration of President Reagan policy package of budget deficit 
reduction is more emphasis on tax increases. For  Manage and Marlow, 
budget deficit reduction will be more effective by creating a policy package 
that the combination of various sources of revenue, rather than solely 
concentrate only on the level of aggregate.  
 
            Furthermore, Manage and Marlow (1987) examine the relationship 
between the central government finances and local government (state) is also 
in the United States. They use the Granger test in detecting tax revenues and 
spending for coverage across the state. They face the reality that there is no 
significant relationship between both these variables. Dahlberg and 
Johansson (1998) obtained the same results for the case of Sweden. 
 
             The econometric methodology , research on the same topic is also 
growing. Anderson, et. al. (1986) examined hypothetical causality in the 
context of   United States economy during the period 1946-83 using a 
Multivariate analysis. Furstenberg, Green, and Jeong (1986) examined the 
inter temporal relationship using VAR model . Coincidence, the results of 
their research supports the proposition "spend now and tax later." Joulfaian 
and Mookerjee (1990) support the reciprocal causality. Cheng (1999) also 
identify the feedback mechanisms in Chile, Panama, Brazil, and Peru. Bhat 
et. al. (1993) supports similar findings in the case of inter-state India. 
 
            In its development, the application of the causality  test spread to the 
unit in the analysis of data across countries. Owoye (1995) do the same with 
Marlow and Manage (1987) data for cross-country G7 member country. He 
obtained the fact that causality  has on  tax revenues to spend on the cases of 
Japan and Italy. Studying Cheng (1999) for eight Latin American countries 
found  with the same Owoye (1995) for the case of Colombia, Dominican 
Republic, Honduras, and Paraguay. 
 
THEORY PLATFORM   
 
       From the theory of fiscal decentralization, the test of causality 
direction get a conceptual justification.  In the country financial analysis , the 
traditional models say that both government expenditures and revenues is 
determined simultaneously as a benevolent government in the government's 
efforts to maximize the welfare of communities (social welfare function) (see 
eg Cullis and Jones, 1992: Chapter 14). The flow of theory is different about 
interdependence between the two variables is started from the hypothetical 
debate between taxes and spending (tax-and-spend) with spending and taxes  
(spend-and-tax). Debate is not only limited to the theoretical level but also 
extends to the empirical area. 
 
            The causality of spending to the revenues (spend-and-tax) means that 
the change of spending occurred before the  change revenue. This is valid 
when the increase in expenditure was created by special events that caused 
the government raise taxes so that people still get public services. 
Hypothetical above was first proposed by Peacock and Wiseman (1979). 
They have reason to believe that increased government spending (as a result 
of shock) will be ongoing (persistent) even after the shock has been done. 
 
Furthermore, Barro (1974)  support this hypothesis whit revealed that 
the household see that the  publishing of  government obligation  for finance  
the increase in  expenditure at the time is now signaling a tax increase in the 
future. In this case the government did tax-smoothing (Barro, 1979). An 
implication of this proposition on the local financial system is that the budget 
is going decentralization. 
 
          The causality of revenues to expenditure (tax-and-spend) indicates that 
the change of revenues before the change expenditure. This case can occur 
when the level of expenditure is adjusted to the changes in revenues. This 
hypothetical was originally proposed by Friedman (1978). According to 
Friedman, the increase in revenue will lead to tax increases so that spending 
can be increased or down to the any level. It can also be supported by 
revenues. A direction causality implication of this system is that local 
financial management which is going very centralized. 
 
           The reverse causality (bi-direction) occurs when the expenditures 
change simultaneously with the change of revenues. This means that the 
government's fiscal synchronize. Hypothetical fiscal synchronization is valid 
when the decision changes the revenues and expenditures in compliance with 
community demands. This proposition was first proposed by Musgrave 
(1966). With this model, Meltzer and Richard (1981) show the magnitude 
(size) in government revenues and expenditures changed proportionally  . 
The implication of two direction causality about local financial management 
is decided together between the control of central government and demands 
from the local region. 
 
           Independence between the two is the amount of change implies that 
government expenditure and revenues are dominated more by 
macroeconomic fluctuations than the changes in one aspect. In this case, the 
budgeting process is seriously affected by divergence various interests and 
certain agenda. Buchanan and Wagner (1977, 1978) propose hypothetical for 
the first time in the context of the state budget. The implications of causality 
independence in the local budget is that there is no coordination between the 
central and local governments in local financial management.  
 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
Causality Test  
 
         The direction of causality test will be done with the approach adopted 
Granger (1969) (see eg Maddala, 1992). Granger test method has been 
applied in many different areas of research both in the developed countries 
and in developing countries. In areas of local public finance, most of the way 
causality between government revenues and expenditures applied to more 
time series data (see for example: Furstenberg, Green, and Jeong, 1986; 
hoover and Sheffrin, 1992; and Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou, 1996), while 
test for panel data are still rarely performed. 
 
               Testing direction causality for panel data  analysis , due to the 
relationship between revenues, expenditures, and the transfer are  began  by 
Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988, 1989). Following Holtz-Eakin, 
Newey, and Rosen , the direction of causality be formed with the model 
vectors autoregressive . Suppose that for two variables will be tested is X and 
Y. The general form of the model vectors autoregressive associated with the 
two variables are as follows: 
Yit  = a0 + k=1m ak Yit-k + l=1n bl Xit-l + u1it   (1a) 
Xit  = 0 + k=1m k Xit-k + l=1n l Yit-l+ u2it   (1b) 
Next, they perform the first level deference to eliminate individual effects, 
which always appear in the panel data: 
Yit  =a0 + k=1m ak Yit-k + l=1n bl Xit-l + u1it   (2a) 
Xit = 0 + k=1m k Xit-k + l=1n l Yit-l + u2it   (2b) 
 
            Based on the second last equation,   The significance of coefficients 
variables  aK and  K help  to predict  the changes in a variable on the basis of 
information that have occurred in the past. While the significance of 
coefficient variables b1 and  1 provide the information of causality direction. 
Statistics evaluation  on the coefficient of  b1 and 1 will give four  possibility 
results: 
1. The causality is going from X to Y when the coefficients of  b1  are 
significant. While  the coefficients of  1 are not  statistically 
significant.  
2. The causality is going from Y to X when the coefficients of  b1 
significant. While  the coefficients of  b1  are not  statistically 
significant.  
3. The causality is going from X to Y  and feedback if the coefficients of  
b1 and 1  are statistically significant.  
4. The causality is not going from X to Y if the coefficients of  b1 and 1  
are not statistically significant. 
 
The tests of statistical significance on the coefficients of  b1 and 1   will be 
overall to compare the results   valuation equation (2) with the results of the 
valuation of the following: 
 
Yit = a0 + k=1m ak Yit-k + u3t ...   (3a) 
Xit = 0 + k=1m k Xit-k + u4it    (3b) 
 
Equality (2) is a form of  unrestricted equality  and equality 3) is the form of  
restricted equality. Causality  test applied to compare the residual  sum of 
square  values obtained on two different model estimations. Formula for the 
test on the pairs of equality are as follows (Maddala, 1992):  
2
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  …… (4)     
with RRSS (restricted residual sum of squares) and the URSS (unrestricted 
residual sum of squares) of each square is the residual from the estimation (3) 
and (2). 
 
The Tests of  Endogenous 
 
         Specifically in the case of transfer, the test of  transfer causality  
direction  will provide  the change of estimation transfer variables estimates 
on the basis of the variable transfer information that has occurred in the past. 
Causality test results for the variable transfer will be complementary with the 
results of the analysis endogenous transfer. Endogenous transfer implies that 
local governments can affect the amount of the transfer so that it can predict 
the amount of transfer that will be received from the central government. 
 
         Transfer distribution in Indonesia follows  the principles of fulfilling 
fiscal gap. Transfer (BH and DA) per capita received by the local government 
is influenced by the rate of population density (Dens), total expenditure (TB) 
of local governments per capita (as a reflection of fiscal needs), income per 
capita (as a reflection of fiscal capacity), regional characteristics, and 
institutional factors, and disturbance factor () . General form of functional 
relationship  inter variables can be arranged as follow: 
BHit = 0 + 1Densit + 2TBit + 3Yit  
  + 4BHit-1 + 5Dkota + 6Dkrisis  
  + 7Dodf + 8[DodfTBit] 
  + 1it ...............................  (5) 
DAit =0 + 1Densit + 2TBit + 3Yit  
  + 4DAit-1 + 5Dkota + 6Dkrisis  
  + 7Dodf + 8[DodfTBit]  
  + 2it ...............................  (6) 
subskrip i and t indicate the regions and time respectively. 
 
           Dkota is dummy  variable  to show the differences between the 
municipalities (1) and regency (0), Dkrisis is dummy variable for the 
economic crisis since 1997. Dodf also included as a variable in the equation 
for the dummy variable of the autonomy and fiscal decentralization since 
2001   with a variable interaction with its variable TB (Dodf  xTB)  order to 
observe changes in behavior  (slope) spending. The Variables of transfer gap  
(BHit-1 and DAit-1) are also included in the model to feel the   bureaucratic 
inertia and incremental (Doessel and Valadkhani, 2002). 
 
            For the central government, the transfer factor is expected to be 
incentive for local government efforts to improve the reception of the 
collection area (Sidik, 2001). Refer to the Naganathan and Sivagnanam 
(1999), collecting local revenues (PAD) is assumed to influence by other 
variables such as local tax rates and local retribution (Tr, tax rate), price (P), 
level of development of the regional economy (Y), regional characteristics , 
and institutional factors as control variables. Its mathematical formulation 
can be stated as follows: 
PADit = 0 + 1BHit + 2DAit + 3Trit + 4Pit  
  + 5Yit + 6PADit-1 + 7DABH  
  + 8DADA + 9Dkota + 10Dkrisis  
  + 11Dodf + 12[DodfBHit]  
  + 13[DodfDAit] + 3it ………… (7) 
   
         The form of DABH and DADA  are dummy variables to show the 
influence of change asymmetry for  each type of transfer for 1 (no symmetry) 
when revenues decrease and  0 (symmetry) when the reverse. Dodf also 
included as a variable in the equation as dummy variable  to show the period 
of autonomy and fiscal decentralization since 2001 and applied the Law 
34/2000 (as substitution Law. 18/1997). Related to the period of autonomy 
and fiscal decentralization, the variables interaction  with the fiscal variables 
BH and DA (Dodf x BH and Dodf x DA) entered into the equation. 
 
          The revenue of transfer is allocated to fund local government. For this 
purpose, estimates the influence of transfer on the activities of the local fiscal 
expenditure to be connecting between   transfer and  local government 
expenditure. Total local government expenditure (TB) consists of two major 
categories, namely operational expenditure (BO) and capital expenditure 
(BM): 
TB = BO + BM...........................  (8) 
Each category is assumed to be influenced  by economic factors, such as 
demographic factors (ie population, Pop), the rate  of real per capita income, 
regional characteristics, and institutional factors as control variables. 
Mathematical formulation can be written as: 
BOit = 0 + 1BHit + 2DAit + 3Popit  
  + 4Yit + 5BOit-1 + 6DABH 
  + 7DADA + 8Dkota + 9Dkrisis  
  + 10Dodf + 11[DodfBHit]  
  + 12[DodfDAit] + 4it .  (9) 
BMit = 0 + 1BHit + 2DAit + 3Popit  
  + 4Yit + 5BMit-1 + 6DABH 
  + 7DADA + 8Dkota + 9Dkrisis  
  + 10Dodf  + 11[DodfBHit]  
  + 12[DodfDAit] + 5it  (10) 
             Spending local governments will contribute to the formation of the 
GDP. According to the theory of regional economic development, 
government policy can stimulate the form of transfer is expected in the long 
term into one of the factors that will affect the region that was originally 
developed to be less able to grow more quickly than other regions that have 
been originally the condition of more advanced so that the regions that can be 
called the first can  catch-up the region which is called the second (Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 1992; 1995) 
 
         Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995), the variables 
suspected of causing the occurrence of convergence mechanisms include 
economic factors, demography, regional differences in characteristics, and 
institutional factors: 
Yit  = 0 + 1BHit + 2DAit + 3Pit  
  + 4Popit + 5Yit-1 + 6DKit + 7Invit  
+ 8DABH + 9DADA + 10Dkota + 11Dkrisis + 12Dodf  
+ 13[DodfBHit] + 14[DodfDAit] + 7it   (11) 
 
           To get the test of  endogenous transfer is   more valid, the value of 
estimation BH and DA (equation 5 and 6) above, eg BHFit and DAFit, will 
be entered into the equation in a system that contains these variables, namely 
(7), ( 9), (10), and (11). Testing is done individually to ensure the value of  
estimation result (5 and 6) above which have been included in each equation 
is estimated and, together with the value of  actual variable BHit and DAit  
generate coefficients that are statistically significant. Anova test endogenous 
as equality (4) is also applied to compare the sum of square residual values 
obtained for each pair of model estimation will be tested. 
 
Data and Variable Specification  
 
This study utilized secondary data obtained from BPS (Central Bureau of 
statistics) and the Directorate General of the Ministry of Finance PKPD. Data 
that examined the data panel, the combination of time series data and across 
regions. The time series data are covering period 1988 to 2003. Scope of the 
study is a spatial city and district. For regions that splitting of the region, the 
data still refers to the main so that obtained series of sustainable data. On the 
basis of this consideration is collected 280 cities and districts. The Sample 
reaches 75 percent over the number of population in 2003. Operational 
definitions of these variables which will be used in this research are presented 
in Table 1. 
 
Before Estimated , the data will be adjusted. As known before 2000,  
fiscal year begins April 1 and ends on 31 March next year. After the 2000 
budget year is changed following the calendar year. These changes require 
adjustment so that the data is consistent with the fiscal economic data and 
other demographic. Conversion of budget data into the  year of  calendar is 
done following realization quarterly budget of each city and district. For city 
and district that does not exist a record quarterly data, the weight of the 
quarterly data using the realization of quarterly budget province  
 
Table 1: Operational Definition of research variables 
Notation meaning Variable definition  unit 
PAD Original Regional Income Revenue of tax and retribution  regions, Profit  of 
owned regional corporate (BUMD), offices, and 
other revenues 
 
Real  per capita 
(million rupiahs) 
 
BH Sharing Funds Transfer 
Tax and Non Tax 
Sharing funds of tan and non tax revenue  Real  per capita 
(million rupiahs) 
 
DA Transfer Allocation Fund 
 
- Before 2001: SDO, Regional Development 
Assistance ( Inpres).  
- After 2001: DAU, and DAK.  
Real  per capita 
(million rupiahs) 
 
DP Balance fund (total 
transfer) 
BH + DA Real  per capita 
(million rupiahs) 
 
PP Revenue of Financing 
 
Over the rest of the calculation of the regional  
budget and loans 
Real  per capita 
(million rupiahs) 
 
TP Total Revenue PAD + BH + DA + PP Real  per capita 
(million rupiahs) 
 
BO Operational expenditure 
(without UKP) 
Realization of  Operational Expenditure  Real  per capita 
(million rupiahs) 
 
BM Capital Expenditure 
(without UKP) 
Realization of  Capital Expenditure  Real  per capita 
(million rupiahs) 
 
TB Total Expenditure (without 
UKP) 
BO + BM Real  per capita 
(million rupiahs) 
 
Tr Local tax rate  The ratio between regional tax revenues and  
retribution with regional income  
percent 
Y Income Gross  Regional Domestic  product  without oil 
and gas 
Real  per capita 
(million rupiahs) 
 
P Deflator Gross Regional 
Domestic Product as a 
proxy of price level  
The ratio between the Current Price  of Gross 
Regional Domestic product   with constant price 
Of Gross Regional Domestic Product 
 
1993 = 100 
Pop Population Population Million people 
Dens Population density population per area  People  per km2 
THE RESULTS  
Table 2 reports a summary of  causality test results among several key variables 
are selected. The variables selected are the components of each budget revenue, 
expenditure,  and income. In general, the pair of key variables will be examined further in 
the causal relationship has two directions. This is indicated by the significance F-test 
calculated on a one-way causality and also calculated the value of the F-test on the model 
specification with the direction of vice versa. 
 
In the budget component  revenues, PAD, BH, and DA have a relationship 
because the result of reciprocity. PAD affects quantity BH and DA, the quantity of the 
second type of transfer is also influenced PAD. As expressed earlier, the transfer is part 
of the funding source (in addition to PAD). The direction of this relationship seems close 
to reality that is happening to the acquisition of PAD is limited, increase in government 
transfers to cover the expenditure. On the other hand, the transfer also theoretically affect 
the quantity of PAD through a decrease in the price of goods and public services. For the 
case of regency and municipalities’ government in Indonesia, the theoretical proposition 
seems to have started developing. 
 
 
 
Table 2: The  causality test of intergovernmental transfer with selected variables 
Direction of causality URSS RRSS F-test Conclusion 
BH  PAD 320,7814 319,7946 2,8728 BH that causes PAD 
PAD  BH 345,2575 341,0118 11,5912 PAD that causes BH 
DA  PAD 320,7814 319,4875 3,7705 DA that causes PAD 
PAD  DA 239,8307 225,8168 57,7767 PAD that causes DA 
BH  BO 223,9519 209,1786 65,7522 BH that causes BO 
BO  BH 345,2575 339,7558 15,0758 BO that causes BH 
DA  BO 223,9519 222,2931 6,9473 DA that causes BO 
BO  DA 239,8307 231,2984 34,3434 BO that causes i DA 
BH  BM 501,5688 488,2200 25,4552 BH that causes BM 
BM  BH 345,2575 340,1939 13,8574 BM that causes BH 
DA  BM 501,5688 457,8211 88,9629 DA that causes BM 
BM  DA 239,8307 218,9998 88,5552 BM that causes DA 
Y  BH  425,9981  427,3495  3,5454 Y  that causes BH 
DA  Y  85,7222  85,8124  1,1763 DA  does not cause Y 
Y  DA  260,4431  269,9082  40,6184 Y  that causes DA 
Note: Degree of significant 95% 
 
Causality  between fiscal variables, such as BH and DA with the second category 
of local government also showed two channel.  The Channel of causality to and from the 
expenses of local governments is already visible in accordance with the model analysis 
that has been specified previously. In general, the results are consistent with previous 
studies for both  time series  data, such as Furstenberg, Green, and Jeong (1986), hoover 
and Sheffrin (1992), and Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (1996) in various countries, as 
well as data panel, as Holtz-Ekin, Newey, and Rosen (1989) in the United States. 
 
An exception occurred in the bilateral  causality  between variables Y  and DA 
and  variable Y and  BH with the vice versa. Special for BH  occurs bilateral causality  
from BH to Y  but not vice versa, as applicable in the model estimates of the transfer 
revenue r. Statistically, the proposition may still be accepted but with degree of 
significant  that  smaller than 85 percent with an error 15 percent. Almost the same thing 
also happened on the DA. The  Y variable affect the quantity of revenue  DA, but DA 
does not affect Y. 
 
This intuition is still acceptable because the two types of transfers are distributed 
to local governments to fund the expenditure, not directly on the individual members of 
the community in the region. According to Hines and Thaler (1995), the transfer can be 
regarded as additional income and therefore the transfer should be spent for the purposes 
directly related to the community. Therefore, the theoretical interpretation that allows the 
top of the eruption is the result of this problem free-riding  between central and local 
government. Local governments have many advantages over the increase in expenditure 
which is funded by the transfer. However, local government financing does not entirely 
bear.  The Cost is dependent on the national level assigned in the form of tax center. 
Thus, because-due to the relationship between each type of transfer to the Y at the 
regional level is only going in one direction. 
 
No causality from DA to Y and from Y to  BH do not mean they can not be 
formed into a functional equation that connects between the two. Likely that the problem 
occurs not on the causality direction  but  on the aspects of  endogenous. These two 
aspects are very closely related. According to Granger and Sims (Maddala, 1992), no 
causality direction  is a necessary condition  for the  exogenous  variable, however, the 
test is not sufficient in exogenous  test. 
 
The Results of  endogenous test  for the two types of transfer  shown in Table 3. 
The table shows that the test statistics individually through t-test showed only type of 
transfer of DA is exogenous , especially through the test model of PAD. With the 
financial situation and the conditions that have forced local governments to use these 
funds to pay employee salaries. Salary and number of employees paid through the DA is 
already certain. Therefore, this  DA variable is seen as exogenous variables . This means 
that local government is less able to affect the amount to be received. 
 
 Overall test  through the F-test statistics indicate the two types of transfers tested 
that are not  exogenous   variable. The results  is proved by calculating the value of F-stat 
is  more than the value on the F-table degree of significant   95 percent . Therefore, null 
hypothesis that the second type of transfer is endogen variables can be received. 
Endogenous  transfer in accordance with this conceptual proposition and results of 
research that has been raised by many previous researchers, such as Schneider and Ji 
Moon (1990), and Knight (2002). 
 
 
Table 3: The causality test of  Endogenous Transfer 
Model 
Test  
Transfer 
test t-test conclusion F-test conclusion 
BHF -19,05766 BH endogenous BH and DA endogenous PAD DAF  0,14865 DA exogenous 
208,6150 
 
BO BHF -15,36238 BH endogenous 136,0142 BH and DA endogenous 
DAF -2,13192 DA endogenous  
BM BHF -10,63079 BH endogenous 216,2617 BH and  DA endogenous 
 DAF  19,89776 DA endogenous   
Y BHF -1.55774 BH exogenous 27,2842 BH and DA endogenous 
 DAF -6.21283 DA endogenous   
         Note: Degree of Significance 95% 
 
Intuitively, This result can still be received. Under a very urgent condition , the  
district and  the city government are  permitted to do a budget adjustment in the middle of 
the year is running with submitting additional transfers to the center  or the provincial 
government. The ability of local governments to make budget adjustments, especially the 
possibility of additional budget transfer, indicates that the local government in  any 
certain conditions have the ability participate in determining the size of the transfer that 
will be received from the central 
 
 
Endogenous transfer give early understanding that the local government transfer 
recipient can predict the amount of transfer that will be accepted on the basis of certain 
variables. As specified earlier, some variables that can be used as a basic transfer 
revenues estimation  to the  city and district government are population density , the level 
of economic development of the local community, the volume of total local government 
expenditure, and  the amount of transfer received in the previous period. The four 
variables are significantly influencing the amount of the two  types of transfer are 
received. With the ability of local governments estimate the amount of transfer that will 
be received, the local government will be able to anticipate the various implications that 
arise when the number of transfers received is not the same as that estimated. 
 
With the evidence of  endogenous  transfer, in the consequences of equality 
simultaneous, transfer must be treated as endogen variable whose value is determined in 
the model and then estimated as one equation that is integrated with the other equalities . 
Transfer as a endogen  variable is very important to reduce the influence of bias 
estimation results in the transfer of the regional economy (Bailey and Connoly, 1998). 
 
Apart from the issue, the test results in Table 2 and 3 on the theoretical 
perspective of fiscal decentralization have implications that even though decentralization 
has been implemented in fiscal year 2001, the local and city government still have a little 
space in the region to manage their own finances. The  availability  only on a limited on 
the quantity  aspects but not on allocation aspects. 
 
Local governments allowed to adjust the budget when the running budget year 
occurs  a mismatch between the target and realization. In such conditions, the local 
government in mid-year budget to make changes at both the b the expenditure and  the 
revenue . In the case of revenue budget  adjustment is still not able to close the budget 
expenditure, local governments will submit additional transfer on the central or provincial 
government. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
           This paper examine the interaction between expenditure, government revenues, 
and the regional economy in the case of cities and districts in Indonesia during the period 
1988-2003. By using econometric analysis , especially  Granger causality  test for panel 
data.  This study found feedback, bilateral causality  between revenues and expenditures 
of local governments. It  shows that the control of the central government in the regions 
on  decision-making is still very strong. In this context, the division of authority between 
the central government, the provincial government, regency and municipalities 
government to be crucial in order not to overlap occurs between the three. The negative 
list, that is all that matters not within the scope of both the central government and  
provincial government and regency / municipalities government  rightly described. 
 
            Other interesting findings is  the one- way  causality  between transfer  revenues 
from central   and regional income.  The regional income Affect transfer revenue, but 
does not apply vice versa. This shows that the region still have an opportunity to increase 
economic growth  acceleration  without depends on the transfer from the central 
government. In line with regional autonomy and fiscal decentralization, these results 
further open opportunities for reformulation  about the role and function of inter-
governmental transfers in the future.  
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